RECENT DEVELOPMENT
INSURANCE: NECESSITY FOR PECUNIARY
INTEREST HELD TO PROVIDE A PRACTICAL
LIMITATION ON THE EXPANSIVE DOCTRINE
OF INSURABLE INTEREST
In Royal Insurance Co. v. Sisters of the Presentation,'the Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an insured who has no
pecuniary2 interest in real property has no insurable interest 3 in that
property, even though he holds undisputed legal title. The Sisters,
whose convent building was in need of repair, contracted with the
Bishop of Oakland, California, to hold their property in perpetuity
for the future construction of a high school. In return, the Bishop
agreed to convey to them an adjoining parcel of land and to erect a
new convent. Pursuant to this contract, the Sisters acquired the
Bishop's land and, upon completion of the new convent, moved out of
their prior dwelling. Preparation for demolition of the unoccupied
convent was commenced immediately. Four days later, when only the
shell of the building remained intact, a fire of undetermined origin
razed the structure. The Sisters sued for recovery of the loss under a
fire insurance policy written by Royal. The federal district court
found that the Sisters held a sufficient insurable interest in the
destroyed property and awarded them $174,000. 4 The Ninth Circuit
reversed, finding the insurance contract void on the ground that the
Sisters had no insurable interest in that property.
The doctrine of insurable interest, although basic to the law of
insurance, is elusive in character. 5 Unless the policy holder has an
insurable interest, an insurance contract is void.6 Due to the import of
1. 430 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1970).

2. Pecuniary is defined as: "Involving money or money's worth. Financial; pertaining or
relating to money; capable of being estimated, computed, or measured by money value."
BALLENTiNS'S LAW DICTIONARY 927

(3d ed.

1969).

3. See generally Salzman, The Law of Insurable Interest in Property Insurance, 1966 INS.
L.J. 394 [hereinafter cited as Salzman].
4. 430 F.2d at 760.
5. See Stockton, An Analysis of Insurable Interest Under Article Two of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 17 VAND. L. REV. 815 (1964).
6. E.g., Crotty v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 144 U.S. 621 (1892) (life insurance policy);
Nelson v. New Hampshire Fire Ins. Co., 263 F.2d 586 (9th Cir. 1959); CAL. INS. CODE § 280
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this concept, one might expect that both the purpose and the nature of
the insurable interest requirement would be settled, but such is not the
case. As to the former, the purpose, legal writers generally agree that
if the insured does not have the requisite insurable interest, three
harmful effects may result: the insured may be tempted to bring about
the insured event; the insurance contract may, in reality, be a mere

wager; or the insured may receive more than simple indemnification
for his loss. 7 However, as to the latter, the nature of insurable interest,
there is little agreement. For example, it has been defined by one

statute to include "[e]very interest in property, or any relation
thereto, or liability in respect thereof, of such a nature that a
contemplated peril might directly damnify the insured. . . ."8 It has
otherwise been defined as: that interest in property which, if the
property were destroyed, would cause a loss to to the interest holder,

depriving him of possession, enjoyment, or profit from the property;'
whatever furnishes a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from
the continued existence of the subject of the insurance; 0 or an interest
whose destruction would cause the suffering of a loss." Insurable
interest has on different occasions been based upon: a property right;
a contract right; 3 a potential legal liability; 4 or a factual expectation

of damage.'5 While a sufficient property right may consist of legal
(West 1955). See generally W. VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE 156-61 (3d ed. 1951) [hereinafter
cited as VANCE].
7. E. PATTERSON, ESSENTIALS OF INSURANCE LAW § 22 (1935) [hereinafter cited as
PATrERsoN]; VANCE 156-57; Harnett & Thornton, Insurable Interest in Property: A Socio-

Economic Reevaluation ofa Legal Concept, 48 COLUMI. L. REv. 1162, 1178-83 (1948).
8. CAL. INS. CODE § 281 (West 1955).
9. German Ins. Co. v. Hyman, 34 Neb. 704,708,52 N.W. 401,402 (1892). See VANCE 16163.
10. American Equitable Assur. Co. v. Powderly Coal &Lumber Co., 225 Ala. 208, 212, 142
So. 37,40 (1932).
I1. Harrison v. Fortlage, 161 U.S. 57, 65 (1896); Hooper v. Robinson, 98 U.S. 528, 538
(1878).
12. See, e.g., Milwaukee Mechanics' Ins. Co. v. B.S. Rhea &Son, 123 F. 9 (6th Cir. 1903);
Convis v. Citizens' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 127 Mich. 616, 86 N.W. 994 (1901); Farmers' Mut. Fire
& Lightning Ins. Co. v. Crowley, 354 Mo. 649, 190 S.W.2d 250 (1945).
13. See, e.g., Planters' & Merchants' Ins. Co. v. Thurston, 93 Ala. 255, 9 So. 268 (1891);
Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Merchants' & Miners' Transp. Co., 66 Md. 339, 7 A. 905 (1887); National
Filtering Oil Co. v. Citizens' Ins. Co., 106 N.Y. 535, 13 N.E. 337 (1887); Graham v. American
Fire Ins. Co., 48 S.C. 195, 26 S.E. 323 (1897).
14. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Baltimore Warehouse Co., 93 U.S. 527 (1876); Liverpool &
London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 83 F.2d 647, cert. denied, 299 U.S. 587 (1936); National
Fire Ins. Co. v. Kinney, 224 Ala. 586, 141 So. 350 (1932).
15. See, e.g., Hecker v. Commercial State Bank, 35 N.D. 12, 159 N.W. 97 (1916); Liverpool
& London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Boiling, 176 Va. 182, 10 S.E.2d 518 (1940); Tischendorf v. Lynn
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title, equitable title, or a substantial property interest, 16 most
jurisdictions recognize the inadequacy of a mere expectant property
interest. 7 The second basis, a contract right, may be found in any

binding contract creating rights which will be injuriously affected by
the destruction of any designated property.', In most cases in which

the third basis-potential legal liability-has been recognized as a
sufficient insurable interest, the interest could also have been tied to

either the contract or property concept. 19 The fourth basis, the factual
expectation of damage concept, is the broadest and most inclusive,
resting on the very general theory that one should have an insurable

interest in any property which, if lost, damaged, or destroyed, might
20
result in his economic disadvantage.

Insurable interest has been found in bailees, 2 executors or

25
24
administrators, 22 pledgees, 23 pledgors in possession, lessors,
30
2
lessees ,26 mortgagors, 27 mortgagees, 1 receivers,2 remaindermen,
stockholders, 3' trustees,3 2 contractors,3 and even sharecroppers.3 This
Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 190 Wis. 33, 208 N.W. 917 (1926). Although no statute expressly refers to
the factual expectation of damages concept, the definitions of insurable interest in some state
statutes are sufficiently broad to encompass this doctrine. See, e.g., CAL. INS. CODE §§ 281-84
(West 1955); N.Y. INS. LAW § 148 (McKinney 1966). See generally Stockton, supra note 5, at
816; PATrERSON 23-26.
16. Salzman 399-400.
17. See, e.g., Baldwin v. State Ins. Co., 60 Iowa 497, 15 N.W. 300 (1883); Lucena v.
Craufurd, 127 Eng. Rep. 630 (H.L. 1806); CAL. INS. CODE § 283 (West 1955). Vance states
that this proposition is true, "however likely and morally certain of realization [the expectancy]
may be." VANCE 157.
18. See Getchell v. Mercantile & Mfrs' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 109 Me. 274, 277, 83 A. 801, 803
(1912).
19. See Stockton, supra note 5, at 817; Harnett & Thornton, supra note 7, at 1170-71. But
see PATrERSON 94-95.
20. See Harnett & Thornton, supra note 7, at 1171-72.
21. See, e.g., Rice Oil Co. v. Atlas Assur. Co., 102 F.2d 561, 573 (9th Cir. 1939).
22. E.g., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 403 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1968).
23. E.g., Dunsmore v. Franklin Fire Ins. Co., 299 Pa. 86, 89, 149 A. 163, 164 (1930).
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Alexander v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 7 Cal. 2d 718, 723, 62 P.2d 735, 737
(1936).
26. Id.
27. E.g., Insurance Co. v. Stinson, 103 U.S. 25, 29 (1880).
28. E.g., Alexander v. Security-First Nat'l Bank, 7 Cal. 2d 718, 723, 62 P.2d 735, 737
(1936).
29. See, e.g., Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co. v. Crosby, 83 F.2d 647 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 299 U.S. 587 (1936).
30. E.g., Jones v. Harsha, 233 Mich. 499, 503, 206 N.W. 979, 980 (1926).
3 1. E.g., Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 403 F.2d 844, 848-49 (5th Cir. 1968).
32. E.g., California Ins. Co. v. Union Compress Co., 133 U.S. 387, 409 (1890).
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wide range of persons permitted recovery evidences a constant
liberalization in determining the existence of the requisite property

interest.3 In the more recent cases concerned with insurable interest,
the courts have continued to broaden the class of persons who have an
insurable interest. For example, in Martin v. State Farm Mutual
Auto Insurance Co., 36 the court held that purchasers of an automobile

under a conditional sales contract had an insurable interest in the
automobile even though they held no legal title; the insureds were in
possession, had equitable title, and were liable on the sales contract

for the automobile. Similarly, vendors of real property, who had
conveyed legal title to the property, given up possession, and retained
only the right to dismantle a dwelling house thereon, were found to
have an insurable interest in the structure.37 One judge, in attempting

to sum up the various bases for insurable interest which his
jurisdiction recognized, stated:
We have held that one can have an insurable interest although he has no
property in the thing insured, or an estate, legal or equitable; that the term
"insurable interest" is more extensive than property or estate; that a qualified
or limited interest in the subject of insurance is sufficient; that any reasonable
expectation of legitimate profit is sufficient to support an insurable interest;
that whatever furnishes a reasonable expectation of pecuniary benefit from the
continued existence of the subject of insurance is a valid insurable interest.8

In Royal the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's finding
that at the time of the fire the Sisters retained sufficient insurable

interest in the destroyed property on two principal grounds. The first
was that the lower court had applied an erroneous definition of
insurable interest.3 1 Citing Davis v. Phoenix Insurance Co.,' and
Martin v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co.,4 the court held
33. E.g., Clarke v. Charles B. Hartman Co., 105 Pa. Super. 118, 121, 159 A. 460, 461
(1932).
34. E.g., Hudson v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 218 N.Y. 133, 137, 112 N.E. 728, 730 (1916).
35. See Salzman 399.
36. 200 Cal. App. 2d 459, 19 Cal. Rptr. 364 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
37. Woodruff v. Southeastern Fire Ins. Co., 426 F.2d 555, 561 (5th Cir. 1970). The insureds,
however, were denied recovery under an insurance policy in spite of the finding that they retained
the requisite interest. The court held that the use of the structure at the time of its loss was
different from the use which both parties to the insurance contract had considered when the
bargain was made. Id. at 562.
38. North British & Mercantile Ins. Co. v. Sciandra, 256 Ala. 409, 416, 54 So. 2d 764, 770
(1951).
39. 430 F.2d at 761-62.
40. 111 Cal. 409,43 P.1115 (1896).
41. 200 Cal. App. 2d 459, 19 Cal. Rptr. 364 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1962).

Vol. 1971:479]

INSURA NCE

that the cases decided under California's statutory definition "have
'42
established that insurable interest consists of pecuniary interest.
Although acknowledging the fact that the Sisters held undisputed
legal title to the property, the court felt that this was insufficient to
constitute insurable interest because "the existence of insurance
'43
interest hinges on economic interests rather than upon legal title.
As the second ground for its decision, the court relied on the nature of
the contractual obligations which the Sisters owed the Bishop. The
Sisters had vacated the premises in performance of their duty under a
contract which dealt with land, a unique property. The Bishop could
have specifically enforced the contract, and, even if the Sisters had
desired to reenter the premises, they could have done so only with the
Bishop's acquiescence. Having abandoned the building under a
specifically enforceable contract and thus having divested themselves
of beneficial interest in the premises, the Sisters had no pecuniary
interest in the property at the time of the fire. Lacking pecuniary
interest, the Sisters had no insurable interest in the destroyed
property; thus, the contract for insurance was void, and the Sisters
could not recover.
With apparently unswerving consistency from the time of its
inception in England, the applicability of the doctrine of insurable
interest has been broadened. In an effort to provide for recovery by
insureds who, under a narrow definition of insurable interest, might
be denied recovery yet suffer a pecuniary loss when the insured
property is damaged or destroyed, the law has expanded the bases
which might constitute insurable interest.4 4 To date the bases
recognized as constituting the requisite interest have been categorized
as a property right, a contractual right, a potential liability, and a
factual expectation of damages.45 If an insured could show that he
qualified under any one of the four tests, he was believed to have an
insurable interest which the courts would enforce." No statute
presently in effect, nor holding in a reported case, has redefined the
concept of insurable interest as the Ninth Circuit has done in Royal
Insurance Co. v. Sisters of the Presentation.The court cites Davis v.
Phoenix Insurance Co. 47 and Martin v. State Farm Mutual Auto
42. 430 F.2d at 761.
43. Id. at 762.

44. See Salzman 395.
45. See notes 12-20 supra and accompanying text.
46. See generally 2 J. JOYCE, LAW OF INSURANCE § 888 (2d ed. 1917).
47. I1 Cal. 409,43 P. 1115 (1896).
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Insurance Co.4 8 for the proposition that "insurable interest consists of
pecuniary interest,"49 implying that pecuniary interest is either a new,
fifth basis for insurable interest or a hybrid of the four bases
previously recognized. Neither case so holds. In both the Davis and
Martin cases, the courts relied upon the established bases of property
right and contractual right to substantiate their findings that the
insureds had a pecuniary interest and consequently an insurable
interest. 0 Neither of these cases holds, as Royal does, that one who
has undisputed, legal title in real property does not have an insurable
interest in that property. Nor does Woodruff v. Southeastern Fire
Insurance Co.51 or Smith v. Jim Dandy Markets, Inc.,," cited by the
court, hold that one who has only legal title in real property lacks an
insurable interest in that property. In Leggio v. Miller National
Insurance Co., 53 the other case upon which the Ninth Circuit relied,
the court indicated that it would hold that one who has legal title in
real property does not necessarily have an insurable interest in that
property, but resolution of that issue was not required for the
54
decision.
Although the Ninth Circuit implies that it is following an
established line of cases in Royal, in actuality the court has expressly
reached a conclusion which other courts have merely hinted at as a
possible revision of the doctrine of insurable interest. In so doing the
Ninth Circuit has imposed a long-overdue, meaningful limitation on
what previously had been a consistently expanding concept. Where,
prior to Royal, undisputed legal title in real property had been
recognized as a property right capable of constituting an insurable
interest, 5 undisputed legal title by itself is now insufficient.
Heretofore, the courts have been forced either to apply vague, general
"definitions" of'insurable interest5" or to choose among highly
48. 200 Cal. App. 2d 459, 19 Cal. Rptr. 364 (4th Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
49. 430 F.2d at 761 (emphasis added).
50. Davis v. Phoenix Ins. Co., I IICal. 409, 414, 43 P. 1115, 1117 (1896); Martin v. State
Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 200 Cal. App. 2d 459, 468-70, 19 Cal. Rptr. 364, 369-70 (4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1962).
51. 426 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1970).
52. 172 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1949).
53. 398 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
54. Id. at 611-12.
55. See Salzman 399,400.
56. E.g., Harrison v. Fortlage, 161 U.S. 57, 65 (1896); Hooper v. Robinson, 98 U.S. 528,
538 (1878); American Equitable Assur. Co. v. Powderly Coal & Lumber Co., 225 Ala. 208, 212,
142 So. 37,40 (1932); CAL. INS. CODE § 281 (West 1955); PATrERSON § 22.
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technical property and contract "rights 5' 7 to determine enforceability
of an insurance contract. The Royal decision allows judges to
consider the "realities . . of [each] situation." s Thus, if the insured
has actually suffered a pecuniary loss, his insurance contract will be
enforceable. On the other hand, if a loss has occurred but the insured,
even though he had legal title in the damaged or destroyed property,
has himself suffered no loss, he will not be allowed to recover. This
concept provides a practical approach to the application of the
insurable interest doctrine. Moreover, the test established by the court
in Royal with regard to naked legal title could be applied generally to
the doctrine of insurable interest. Under Royal, merely showing that
one is a stockholder, remainderman, or some other "interested"
party would no longer be sufficient to prove that he has an insurable
interest. Instead, the insured would be required to show that
occurrence of the event insured against caused him to suffer a real,
pecuniary loss. Application of the Royal test provides the courts with
a method of determining insurable interest which has meaning to the
parties concerned, since both the insured and the insurer surely
intended that pecuniary recovery under the policy should be based on
the insured's actual pecuniary loss. The Royal doctrine provides a
mechanism to accomplish this end.
57. See notes 12-13 supra and accompanying text.
58. 430 F.2d at 761.
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